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ADHESION THEORY IN CALIFORNIA:
A SUGGESTED REDEFINITION AND
ITS APPLICATION TO BANKING
by Richard P. Sybert*
I. INTRODUCTION
Form contracts which are offered to the general public on a mass basis
play an important part in the modern American economy. It is in fact
seldom that a classic "dickered" contract appears today in a consumer
setting. From taking a bus to an automobile showroom, to agreeing to
purchase a car, to paying for it by check, to buying gas for it with a credit
card, to parking it in a lot, the individual's contractual relations and the
incidents of daily life are defined by standardized agreements presented
to him or her as faits accomplis.1
Through advance knowledge on the part. of the enterprise offering the
contract that its relationship with each individual consumer or offeree
will be uniform, standard and fixed, the device of form contracts in-
troduces a degree of efficiency, simplicity, and stability.2 When such
contracts are used widely, the savings in cost and energy can be substan-
tial. 3 An additional benefit is that the goods and services which are
covered by these contracts are put within the reach of the general public,
whose sheer size might prohibit widespread distribution if the necessary
* A.B., 1973 (University of California, Berkeley); J.D., 1977 (Harvard University).
Member, State Bar of Hawaii. The author has complete and sole responsibility for this
article, and would like to thank particularly Ms. Carole Law for her work and suggestions,
and also Mr. Robert A. Susk, as well as the Honorable Martin Pence, Senior U.S. Judge,
District of Hawaii, for his encouragement.
1. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781,784 (1961)
(quoting FRIEDMANN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN 45 (1951)); C
& J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 1975) (quoting
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Slawson, Standard Form Contracts)).
2. Hurd & Bush, Unconscionability: A Matter of Conscience for California Consumers,
25 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 9 n.38 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hurd & Bush]; Comment,
Contracts of Adhesion under California Law, I U.S.F. L. REV. 306, 307 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Comment, Contracts of Adhesion] (quoting H. JONES, E. FARNSWORTH, & W.
YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 150 (1965)); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52
HARV. L. REV. 700, 701 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn].
3. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 701-02.
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contractual relationships had to be individualized. Transactional costs, 4
and therefore the possible prices of these goods and services, are
reduced.
In short, form contracts appear to be a necessary concomitant of a
sophisticated, mass-consumption economy. They have social and
economic utility.5
On the other hand, the terms of form contracts are dictated by the
offeror, and just as the parties are spared the time and expense of
bargaining, so too are they precluded from it. 6 The obvious danger exists
that the party who draws up the contract will do so unfairly to his or her
advantage.
What, then, are courts to do when presented with such a dilemma? The
impracticality and disutility of simply prohibiting form contracts are
manifest. At the opposite end of the spectrum, simply to apply standard
contractual analysis and to rule that parties are bound by those terms to
which they agreed-at least in theory if not in reality-however one-
sided or unbargained-for, would be unjust. Courts must then seek a
middle ground of preserving form contracts as a device, while denying
them any clearly unfair effect.
A variety of doctrines and devices have been used by judges and
legislators to regulate contracts generally. These include strict construc-
tion of "ambiguities" and interpretation in general, undue influence,
duress, fraud and misrepresentation, mistake, reformation and rescis-
sion, and failure or lack of consideration. 7 In the area of form contracts, a
4. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts, supra note 1, at 531.
5. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632-33 (1943); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Em-
peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 504 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Leff];
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts, supra note 1, at 530; Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 701-
02.
6. The lack of bargaining in fact raises the larger point of whether form contracts are
contracts at all. Slawson, in what appears to be the extreme view, argues they are not.
Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Slawson, Lawful Fraud]; Slawson, Standard Form Contracts, supra
note 1, at 544. The essence of a contract is agreement, "meeting of the minds," and mere
acceptance en masse of unilateral, previously-prepared terms may not be easy to so
characterize, particularly where little freedom of choice or abstention exists. In a real
sense, acceptance of a form contract might be seen as nothing more than the purchase of
the good or service it represents, which no more indicates agreement to its specific terms
than purchase of a chainsaw indicates "agreement" to or knowledge of its mechanical
innards, or waiver of claims based on mechanical defects. Slawson uses the example of a
refrigerator. Slawson, Lawful Fraud, supra, at 17. See also Llewellyn, supra note 2, at
700.
7. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1565-1579 (West 1954); id. §§ 1635-1662, 1688-1689
(West 1973); 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 532-572 (1960 & Supp. 1971); Ehrenzweig,
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number of American courts, prominent among them California, have
denominated as "contracts of adhesion" those which are offered to the
public on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,8 and at least one of them, again
California, has developed as a corresponding regulatory tool a doctrine
that will be referred to here as "adhesion theory." 9
This article will examine the development and application of this
adhesion theory as it now stands in California, consider possible criti-
cisms, and suggest a redefined approach. The suggested approach will
then be hypothetically tested on the banking industry and its form
contracts, focusing specifically on three examples: service charges, stop-
payments on guaranteed checks, and changes in existing contracts such
as credit cards.
I. USE OF EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES TO REGULATE CONTRACTS
The traditional equitable devices used by the courts to regulate
contracts obtain generally in California and are now partially imbedded
in statutes.10 These include the doctrines of undue influence,"I fraud,1
2
menace and duress, 13 and mistake.14 The familiar rules of construction,
such as the principle that a contract will be construed against its drafter,
15
give the courts additional regulatory tools.16 Other methods have been
Adhesion Contracts in the Conflicts of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1090 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig]; Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 702.
8. See cases cited notes 27-28 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 59-106 infra.
10. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1565-1579 (West 1954); id. §§ 1688-1693 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1977).
11. Id. §§ 1566-1567, 1575 (West 1954); id. § 1689(b)(1) (West 1973). See, e.g., In re
Estate of Kohler, 79 Cal. 313, 315-16, 21 P. 758, 758 (1889); Smalley v. Baker, 262 Cal.
App. 2d 824, 834-35, 69 Cal. Rptr. 521, 528 (1968); Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist.,
246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 130, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 538 (1966); Espinosa v. Stuart, 52 Cal. App.
477, 481, 199 P. 66, 68 (1921).
12. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1566-1568, 1571-1574 (West 1954); id. § 1689(b)(1) (West 1973).
See, e.g., Wilke v. Coinway, Inc., 257 Cal. App. 2d 126, 137, 64 Cal. Rptr. 845,852 (1967);
Howland v. Meximerican Co., 55 Cal. App. 581, 583-84, 203 P. 1019, 1020 (1921); Fulmele
v. Los Angeles Inv. Co., 51 Cal. App. 417, 420, 196 P. 923, 924 (1921).
13. CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1566-1567, 1569-1570 (West 1954); id. § 1689(b)(1) (West 1973).
14. Id. §§ 1566-1567, 1576-1579 (West 1954); id. § 1689(b)(1) (West 1973). See, e.g.,
Verzan v. McGregor, 23 Cal. 339, 345 (1863); Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank v. Kuchman, 224
Cal. App. 2d 490, 495-96, 36 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809 (1964).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654 (West 1973). See, e.g., Taylor v. J.B. Hill Co., 31 Cal. 2d
373, 374, 189 P.2d 258, 259 (1948); Pacific Lumber Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 22
Cal. 2d 410, 422, 139 P.2d 892, 898 (1943); Blackburn v. Allen, 218 Cal. App. 2d 30, 33-34,
32 Cal. Rptr. 211,213-14 (1963); Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App.2d 690, 695, 10
Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (1961); Steeve v. Yaeger, 145 Cal. App. 2d 455, 463, 302 P.2d 704, 710
(1956).
16. These tools have been criticized as sometimes enabling courts to rewrite contracts
without a frank admission of what they are doing, thereby distorting the judicial law-
1978]
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used: for example, a provision in a bank passbook that released the bank
from liability on forged endorsements, unless complained of within a set
period, was held to constitute a "trap for the unwary" since it was
neither signed nor brought to the attention of the depositor, and therefore
was denied effect. 7 Parties are also held to a requirement of fair dealing
in performance of contracts.II Unconscionability, or something akin to it,
is probably also available in California. Although California was the one
major commercial state to reject section 2-302 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (U.C.C.) 9 on unconscionability, its courts have by no means
been unable to deal with unconscionable contract provisions.20 For one
thing, it has been suggested that one of the reasons for rejection was that
"unconscionability . . . was already sufficiently developed in Califor-
nia law." ' 21 For another, since article 2 of the U.C.C. governs only the
sale of goods, 22 it might be legitimate to decline drawing general infer-
ences from the rejection to be applied to other contracts. At any rate,
cases have been decided on grounds drawn from unconscionability doc-
trine, whether labeled as "public policy" 23 or as refusal to enforce
contracts which "shock the conscience.''24
making process, 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 540 (1960 & Supp. 1971); Ehrenzweig, supra
note 7, at 1090; Hurd & Bush, supra note 2, at 17; Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 702-04; or as
affording inadequate consumer protection. Hurd & Bush, supra note 2, at 17.
17. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Sav. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 613, 182 P. 293, 298 (1919);
Frankini v. Bank of America, 31 Cal. App. 2d 666, 675-76, 88 P.2d 790, 796 (1939).
18. See, e.g., Harm v. Frasher, 181 Cal. App. 2d 405, 417, 5 Cal. Rptr. 367, 374 (1960).
19. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1958 version) provides: "If the court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."
20. California courts have in fact denied enforcement to contracts called "unconsciona-
ble." See, e.g., Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal. App. 2d 684, 693, 135 P.2d 179, 183 (1943)
("Equity will not. . . enforce contracts which upon their face are so manifestly harsh and
oppressive as to shock the conscience; it must be affirmatively shown that such contracts
are fair and just."); State Fin. Co. v. Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 691-92, 112 P.2d 901,903
(1941) (gross inadequacy of consideration such as to shock the conscience may amount to
proof of fraud, oppression and undue influence). The Smith case stands alone among
California cases in finding fraud based upon inadequate consideration in a consumer
setting; it has therefore been suggested that the case is weak authority for allowing relief
from unconscionability in a consumer setting. Hurd & Bush, supra note 2, at 41.
21. Hurd & Bush, supra note 2, at 5. Other reasons given were that "unconscionability
violated freedom of contract [and] was too vague." Id. These reasons have been criticized
as "invalid." Id.
22. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1962 version) (codified at CAL. COM. CODE § 2102 (West 1964)).
23. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963); Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968). See
notes 57-58 infra and accompanying text.
24. See cases cited note 20 supra. Unconscionability has also been criticized as a
"covert tool," Leff, supra note 5, at 558-59 (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 703), or
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A relatively recent addition to the California array of contract-regulat-
ing devices is statutory regulation or specification of form contracts
covering specific matters. 25 "The general purpose of these statutes is to
protect the public from overreaching by persons whose economic power
or technical knowledge make bargaining on an equal footing virtually
impossible.' '26 Not dissimilar in purpose is adhesion theory, another
recent addition and the subject of this article.
Ill. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADHESION THEORY
A. What is a Contract of Adhesion?
California case law is replete with definitions of "contract of adhe-
sion." One such judicially adopted definition states that a contract of
adhesion is a "standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the
party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party
only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it. "27 A somewhat
longer formulation states:
The term refers to a standardized contract prepared entirely by one
party to the transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a
contract, due to the disparity in bargaining power between the
draftsman and the second party, must be accepted or rejected by the
second party on a "take it or leave it" basis, without opportunity for
bargaining and under such conditions that the "adherer" cannot
obtain the desired product or service save by acquiescing in the form
agreement.
28
Other definitions differ in wording but emphasize the same factors: "A
as providing inadequate protection for consumers since applied only in the exceptional
case. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts, supra note 1, at 564.
25. E.g., swimming pool sales, retail installment contracts, car purchases. See 1 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 14 (8th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1976).
26. Id.
27. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784
(1961), quoted with approval in Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d
315, 325, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816, 821 (1975); Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 44 Cal. App. 3d 970,
973, 119 Cal. Rptr. 171, 172-73 (1975); Player v. George M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 18 Cal.
App. 3d 526, 533, 96 Cal. Rptr. 149, 154 (1971); Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268
Cal. App. 2d 735, 737, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367, 368 (1969). See also Hamilton v. Stockton
Unified School Dist., 245 Cal. App. 2d 944, 951-52, 54 Cal. Rptr. 463, 467-68 (1966).
28. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 377 P.2d 284, 297, 27 Cal. Rptr.
172, 185 (1962) (footnotes *omitted); see also Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d
111, 122 n. 12, 539 P.2d 433, 441 n. 12, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649, 657 n. 12 (1975); Gray v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 64 Cal. 2d 263, 269, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1966); Vernon v.
Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 714-15, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 152 (1975);
Lomanto v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. App. 3d 663, 668, 99 Cal. Rptr. 442, 444 (1972);
Walnut Creek Pipe Distribs. v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., 228 Cal. App. 2d 810, 814-15,
39 Cal. Rptr. 767, 771 (1964).
1978]
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contract is 'adhesive' for one of its parties if the party had no reasonable
choice as to its terms." '2 9 " 'Adhesion contract' is a handy shorthand
descriptive of standard form printed contracts prepared by one party and
submitted to the other on a 'take it or leave it' basis. The law has
recognized there is often no true equality of bargaining power in such
contracts .... "30
The name "contract of adhesion" indicates that the legal transaction
is not formulated as a result of the give and take of bargaining where
the, desires of one party are balanced to those of the other. The
customer, by entering the transaction, has to adhere to the terms
prescribed by the enterprise and only a very few terms may be open
to his determination.
31
"Obligations arising from such a contract inure not alone from the
consensual transaction, but from the relationship of the parties," 32 name-
ly great disparity of bargaining strength.
In Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals33 the California Supreme
Court, in holding a group medical plan not to be a contract of adhesion,
identified three factors in "the characteristic adhesion contract case": 
34
[11 [T]he stronger party drafts the contract, and the weaker has no
opportunity. . . to negotiate concerning its terms. . . .[2] In many
cases of adhesion contracts, the weaker party lacks . . . also any
realistic opportunity to look elsewhere for a more favorable
contract; he must either adhere to the standardized agreement or
forego the needed service. . . .[3] Finally, in all prior contract of
adhesion cases, the courts have concerned themselves with weight-
ed contractual provisions which served to limit the obligations or
liability of the stronger party.
3 5
29. Slawson, Lawful Fraud, supra note 6, at 47 (citing Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 101, 383 P.2d 441,446, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 38 (1963)). See also Comment,
Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 2, at 306.
30. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 383 n.5 (9th Cir. 1965); see also
Blakely v. Housing Auth., 8 Wash. App. 204, 212-13, 505 P.2d 151, 156 (1973).
31. Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 157 n.4, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290
n.4 (1970) (citing Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A
Comparative Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TUL. L. REV. 481
(1962)). See also Reith, Contractual Exculpation from Tort Liability in California-The
"True Rule" Steps Forward, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 350 (1964).
32. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
107 (1966); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 377 P.2d 284, 297, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172, 185 (1962); see also Hays v. Pacific Indem. Group, 8 Cal. App. 3d 158, 162-63,
165, 86 Cal. Rptr. 815, 818-20 (1970); Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Pihblic
Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1253 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Tobriner & Grodin].
33. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
34. Id. at 711, 552 P.2d at 1185, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
35. Id. at 711, 552 P.2d at 1185-86, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889-90.
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In other states the term has been similarly defined, often in reliance on
California authority, and emphasis has been laid on the absence of
bargaining or negotiation.36
The following have been held to be contracts of adhesion in Califor-
nia:37 standard insurance policies, 38 an employment contract, 39 standard-
ized bills of lading and shipping documents, 4' a release from liability for
future negligence imposed on a prospective patient as a condition for
admission to a charitable research hospital, 4 a bank trust deed,42 an
escrow agreement,43 a contractor's agreement with a subcontractor, 44 a
home remodeling contract,45 and a contract for the transport of horses. 46
Outside of California, application of the term appears to have been
limited to i'nsurance contracts. 47 Generally it appears in a consumer,
rather than commercial, setting a8 since great bargaining disparity is
present more often in the former.
36. See Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 1261-62 n.4 (5th
Cir. 1976); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1380 (2d Cir. 1975); Gowing v. Great
Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Kan. 78, 79-80, 483 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (1971); Surface v. Ranger
Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Mo. 1975); Magulas v. Travelers Ins. Co., 114 N.H. 704,706,
327 A.2d 608, 609 (1974); Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 305, 208 A.2d
638, 644 (1965). See also Corgiatelli v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 616, 619,
533 P.2d 737, 740 (1975); McAlear v. Saint Paul Ins. Cos., 493 P.2d 331, 335 (Mont. 1972).
37. See also Hurd & Bush, supra note 2, at 35 n.199.
38. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966);
Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 66 Cal. App. 3d 464, 136 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1977); Logan v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1974); Young v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 453, 77 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1969).
39. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1961).
40. Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971); see also Chandler v.
Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967).
41. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963).
42. Lomanto v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. App. 3d 663, 99 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1972).
43. Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968).
44. Player v. George M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 18 Cal. App. 3d 526, 96 Cal. Rptr. 149
(1971).
45. Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 119 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1975).
46. Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971).
47. See, e.g., National Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360, 365-67 (Alas. 1970);
Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 294, 127 S.E.2d 53, 58 (1962);
Arrigo's Fleet Serv., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 54 Mich. App. 482, 487, 221 N.W.2d
206, 209 (1974); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Shasky, 266 Or. 312,
317, 512 P.2d 987, 989 (1973). See also Zurich Ins. Co. v. Rombaugh, 384 Mich. 228, 232-
33, 180 N.W.2d 775, 777-78 (1970); Jones v. Continental Cas. Co., 123 N.J. Super. 353,
359-60, 303 A.2d 91, 94-95 (1973); cases cited note 36 supra.
48. K-Lines, Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co., 273 Or. 242, 252-53, 541 P.2d 1378, 1384 (1975).
There may be an adhesion contract in a commercial setting, provided the necessary
characteristics, such as bargaining disparity, are present. See, e.g., Player v. George M.
Brewster & Son, Inc., 18 Cal. App. 3d 526, 96 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1971) (contractor and
subcontractor).
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Adhesion theory was given its first meaningful judicial expression in
1960 by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the leading case of Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. '9 The court, citing articles on contracts of
adhesion, identified the "standardized mass contract" as one in which
there was an extreme or gross bargaining disparity between parties, 50 and
where the weaker party could not bargain because the stronger party had
a monopoly or because all competitors used the same contract terms. The
stronger party dictated its terms without bargaining, as addressed to all its
customers rather than to a particular individual. 5' The New Jersey court
declared that where the services offered were of a public or quasi-public
nature, the stronger party should be held to a requirement of fair dealing
because members of the public generally have no other means of fulfill-
ing the special need represented by the contract.52 The court indicated
automobiles to be of such a nature.53
The Henningsen court held that the car manufacturer's attempted
disclaimer of implied warranties of merchantability and obligations aris-
ing therefrom was void as against public policy.54 This holding was
grounded, at least in part, on adhesion theory. 55 The court noted the
importance of the doctrine of freedom of contract and that a contract
signer who fails to read is bound, but concluded that "in the framework
of modern commercial life and business practices, such rules cannot be
applied on a strict, doctrinal basis . . .[without] giving due weight to
49. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Adhesion theory had previously been specifically
discussed in Judge Frank's dissent in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189 (2d
Cir. 1955), where the majority, in holding no waiver of the one-year statute of limitations,
incidentally upheld the validity of a choice-of-law provision on a steamship ticket. Judge
Frank would have held the limitation to have been waived, and wrote:
I call attention to another factor which, while unnecessary to my conclusion, I think
supports it: The ticket is what has been called a "contract of adhesion" or a "take-it-
or-leave-it" contract. In such a standardized or mass-production agreement, with
one-sided control of its terms, when the one party has no real bargaining power, the
usual contract rules, based on the idea of "freedom of contract," cannot be applied
rationally. For such a contract is "sold not bought." The one party dictates its
provisions; the other has no more choice in fixing those terms than he has about the
weather.
Id. at 204. See also Bekken v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W.
200 (1940).
For the origins of the term "contract of adhesion," see Hurd & Bush, supra note 2, at
10 n.38; Leff, supra note 5, at 504-05 nn.67 & 68; Patterson, The Interpretation and
Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 856 n.96 (1964); Patterson, The
Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
50. 32 N.J. at 389-90, 403, 161 A.2d at 86-87, 94.
51. Id. at 389-90, 161 A.2d at 86-87.
52. Id. at 399, 161 A.2d at 92.
53. Id. at 387, 161 A.2d at 85.
54. Id. at 408, 161 A.2d at 97.
55. Id. at 389-90, 161 A.2d at 86-87.
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. . . the mass production methods of manufacture and distribution to the
public, and the . bargaining position occupied by the ordinary
consumer in such an economy."
5 6
In California the first important judicial statement on adhesion
contracts came in 1963 in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia." In that case the California Supreme Court invalidated, under Civil
Code section 1668, an attempted exculpatory release provision in a
hospital admission form. The court discussed factors that would be
considered in determining whether a transaction reached the public inter-
est and therefore could not contain an exculpatory provision. The fourth
and fifth of these went to adhesion theory:
As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic
setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a
decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the
public who seeks his services. In exercising a superior bargaining
power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a pur-
chaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection
against negligence.
58
B. Application of Adhesion Theory in California
1. "Reasonable Expectations" of the Adherer
The heart of California's adhesion theory is that a contract of adhesion
will be interpreted by a court to meet the reasonable expectations of the
weaker party;59 that is, the court will determine what an ordinary "adher-
56. Id. at 386, 161 A.2d at 84.
57. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
58. Id. at 99-101, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38 (footnotes omitted). The
court's discussion of the other factors may also be seen as relevant in light of further
discussion infra:
[T]he attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction which exhibits some or
all of the following characteristics. It concerns a business of a type generally thought
suitable for public regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing
a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical
necessity for some members of the public. The party holds himself out as willing to
perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it; or at least for any
member coming within certain established standards. . . . As a result of the transac-
tion, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller,
subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.
Id. at 98-101, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38 (footnotes omitted).
59. Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 710, 552 P.2d 1178, 1185, 131
Cal. Rptr. 882, 889 (1976); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269-70, 419 P.2d 168,
171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 868-
69, 377 P.2d 284, 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (1962); Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 995, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 (1974); Young v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 453, 460-61, 77 Cal. Rptr. 382, 387 (1969); Tobriner & Grodin,
supra note 32, at 1273. See also Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 65 Cal. 2d 100, 112,
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er" would reasonably expect he or she was contracting for, and will give
effect to that determination.60 The weaker party is protected at the
expense of the stronger-positioned draftsman 61 when necessary to avoid
the injustice or unfair imposition which would result if literal effect were
given the terms of the contract. 62
A careful examination of the cases, however, reveals that in almost all
instances, the purported giving of effect to reasonable expectations came
in the guise of contract interpretation or lack of disclosure.63 The familiar
rule that ambiguities will be construed against the drafter of a document
is simply declared to be applicable with particular force in the case of
adhesion contracts. 64 And a number of cases have stated flatly that terms
in an adhesion contract, if they are unambiguous and are brought home to
the adherer, are effective.
65
416 P.2d 801, 809, 52 Cal. Rptr. 569, 577 (1966); Hays v. Pacific Indem. Group, 8 Cal. App.
3d 158, 164-65, 86 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (1970); Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961, 967-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Keeton].
60. See cases -cited note 59 supra. See also Kessler, supra note 5, at 637 ("In dealing
with standardized contracts courts have to determine what the weaker contracting party
could legitimately expect by way of services according to the enterpriser's 'calling,' and to
what extent the stronger party disappointed reasonable expectations based on the typical
life situation.").
61. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 270-72, 491 P.2d 168, 172-73, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104, 108-09 (1966); Employers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Foust, 29 Cal. App. 3d 382, 386, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 508 (1972).
62. Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 973-74, 119 Cal. Rptr. 171, 172-73
(1975); Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668,672,97
Cal. Rptr. 811, 813 (1971).
63. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 271-72,419 P.2d 168, 173, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104, 109 (1966); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 869, 377 P.2d 284, 288, 27
Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (1962); Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 975, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 171, 174 (1975); Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988,
994-95, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 (1974); Young v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App.
2d 453, 460-61, 77 Cal. Rptr. 382, 387 (1969); Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268
Cal. App. 2d 735, 738, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367, 369 (1969).
A number of other cases have also turned on ambiguities in contract language or on lack
of notice as to provisions not to be reasonably expected. See Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal.
App. 3d 358, 370, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (1971) (provision in a contract for transportation of
race horses limiting liability to $200 per horse; with respect to standardized adhesion
contracts between parties of unequal bargaining strength, court held that exclusionary
clauses and provisions limiting liability were ineffective in the absence of "plain and clear
notification to the public" and "an understanding consent"); Hays v. Pacific Indemn.
Group, 8 Cal. App. 3d 158, 164-65, 86 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (1970) (term in comprehensive
liability policy purchased by contractor excluding coverage for liability for products
hazard in operations which had not yet been completed or abandoned); Hertzka &
Knowles v. Salter, 6 Cal. App. 3d 325, 336, 86 Cal. Rptr. 23, 30 (1970) (language of
insurance policy relating to "measure of loss").
64. Player v. George M. Brewster & Son, 18 Cal. App. 3d 526, 533-34, 96 Cal. Rptr. 149,
153-54 (1971); Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 695, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781,
784 (1961).
65. Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 315, 325-26, 122 Cal. Rptr.
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2. Ambiguous Terms Construed Against Drafting Party
As noted in the previous section, the California adhesion cases may be
interpreted as applications of the rule that ambiguities will be construed
against the party drafting a contract or as applications of a notice require-
ment, or both.66 This section examines cases relevant to ambiguity.
In Spence v. Omnibus Industries67 the court stated that the contract in
question was one of adhesion and therefore any ambiguity would be
resolved against the draftsman if the terms were not brought home to the
adherers. 68 In Employers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Foust69 the court
held that it must interpret an insurance contract to meet the insured's
reasonable expectation of coverage under the term "bodily injury"
absent express exclusion.7° In Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. 71 the court
rendered its decision on the basis of interpretation of the contract lan-
guage, noting, "No one can determine whether the third party suit does
or does not fall within the indemnity coverage of the policy until that suit
is resolved; . . . this uncertainty . . . could have been clarified by the
language of the policy . "7. 2
In Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co. 73 the plaintiff employee's
wife made an unsuccessful attempt to rescind a stock repurchase plan by
relying upon adhesion theory. The court emphasized that the result of
characterizing a contract as adhesive is only to permit a construction of
uncertain or ambiguous terms in favor of the weaker party; the contract is
valid and, in the absence of uncertainty or ambiguity, enforceable ac-
cording to its terms: "[D]espite the fact that contracts of adhesion are the
product of mass production and afford the party to whom they are
tendered little, if any, room in which to bargain, they are perfectly valid
and, in the absence of ambiguity, are enforced according to their
terms. ' 74
816, 821-22 (1975); Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 738, 74
Cal. Rptr. 367, 369 (1969); California School Employees Ass'n v. Willits Unified School
Dist., 243 Cal. App. 2d 776, 787, 52 Cal. Rptr. 765, 771 (1966) (handbook issued to school
employees; no ambiguity, and therefore no relevance in consideration of contracts of
adhesion).
66. See note 63 supra. See also Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 306 N.Y. 357, 365-66, 118
N.E.2d 555, 559 (1954).
67. 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 119 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1975).
68. Id. at 974, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
69. 29 Cal. App. 3d 382, 105 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
70. Id. at 386-87, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
71. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
72. Id. at 271-72, 419 P.2d at 173, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
73. 49 Cal. App. 3d 315, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975).
74. Id. at 325, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (emphasis in original).
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3. Notice Required if Limitations Placed on Reasonable Expectations
In addition to construing ambiguities against the drafting party,
California courts have also emphasized the necessity of notice and
disclosure of terms or conditions in adhesion contracts which would not
normally fall within the reasonable expectations of the adherer.
75
In Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 76 Justice Tobriner, writing for the
court, held that noncoverage under an insurance policy, in a situation in
which the public would reasonably expect coverage, must be "conspicu-
ous, plain and clear." 7 7 In this case, the decedent bought a standardized
air traveller insurance policy from a vending machine in an airport; the
policy did, not insure for unscheduled flights. The traveller was subse-
quently killed in an air accident when he took a small chartered airplane
in place of his scheduled flight, all scheduled carriers being grounded due
to bad weather. The court found coverage. Justice Tobriner noted that the
question of clear notice of noncoverage would be evaluated in light of
several factors: "[1] the purpose and intent of the parties in entering the
contract, [2] the adherer's knowledgeand understanding as a reasonable
layman, [3] his normal expectation of the extent of coverage, and [4] the
effect, if any, of the substitution of the transportation upon the risk
undertaken by the insurer. "78
In Schmidt v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. ,79 the court stated
that in the absence of ambiguity, adhesion contracts are enforced accord-
ing to their terms,80 but that two additional rules apply in interpretation,
especially if the adhesion contract is one of insurance. First, the contract
must be interpreted in the light of the reasonable and normal expectations
of the parties as to the extent of the coverage, and second, (and here the
court cited Steven) if the insurer deals with the public on a mass basis,
notice of noncoverage must be "conspicuous, plain and clear" where the
public may reasonably expect coverage. 81
75. See cases cited note 63 supra.
76. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
77. Id. at 878, 377 P.2d at 294, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
78. Id. at 869, 377 P.2d at 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176. Chief Justice Traynor dissented on
the ground that a purchaser would not reasonably believe the coverage to go to other than
scheduled air carriers. See text accompanying notes 124-27 infra.
79. 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1969).
80. Id. at 737-38, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 369. The court wrote:
If a contract of adhesion is found to be ambiguous, the same well recognized rules of
construction are applied to it as are applied to other contracts. . . .(1) Any ambiguity
or uncertainty in the contract is to be resolved against the insurer; (2) if semantically
permissible, the contract will be given such construction as will fairly achieve its
object of securing indemnity to the insured for losses to which the insurance relates;
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In Logan v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. ,82 another
insurance adhesion case, the court noted that ambiguity was not a
concern per se, and that an unambiguous provision could still give rise
to the fatal defect of no notice if the insured did not see the provision.
8 3
Refusing to give effect to language in an accidental death insurance
policy that excluded coverage when the insured was intoxicated,84 the
court stated that it gleaned from Steven and its "progeny" cases a
"general principle of public policy as follows: In the case of standardized
insurance contracts, exceptions and limitations on coverage that the
insured could reasonably expect, must be called to his attention, clearly
and plainly before the exclusions will be interpreted to relieve the insurer
of liability or performance.' '85 It held that the insured would not have
reasonably expected noncoverage in case of death while intoxicated.
86
In Young v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,87 the court invalidated a
limitation on death benefits until after the insured received a physical
examination, since his reasonable expectation would be that coverage
would begin immediately. The court held that the insurer, as the domi-
nant and expert party in the field, must not only draft such contracts in
unambiguous terms but must bring to the attention of the insured all
provisions and conditions which create exceptions or limitations on the
coverage.
88
C. Establishment and Application of Adhesion Principles
1. General Principles Established by the Cases
Bearing in mind that cases do not always lend themselves to tidy
formulae, and that judges as well as facts are not uniform, it is submitted
that the California adhesion decisions previously discussed support the
following general principles:
The adhesion theory rationale is that the stronger party may not limit
its liability or performance, as defined either by law or by its representa-
tions, 89 and towards this end,
(1) Any ambiguity in an objectionable adhesive term will be seized
82. 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1974).
83. Id. at 995, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
84. Id. at 996, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
85. Id. at 995, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 532 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 996, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 533. See text accompanying note 125 infra.
87. 272 Cal. App. 2d 453, 77 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1969).
88. Id. at 460-61, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
89. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 32 (written with respect to insurance
companies and banks, but with language of general applicability): "[T]he heart of the
concept of the public service institution. . .[is] its insistence that the institution, as a
public functionary, perform the basic undertaking that it holds itself out as doing."
Id. at 1277 (footnote omitted).
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upon and construed most strictly against the drafter;90
(2) An unusual or unexpected term in an adhesion contract which
falls outside the weaker party's "reasonable expectations" will
be denied effect against him, unless it has been brought to his
attention by express notice, as by clear, plain and conspicuous
language on the face of the contract;
91
(3) If an unreasonable adhesive term is unambiguous and has been
brought to the attention of the weaker party, a court may still
delete it on equitable grounds, as against public policy.
92
2. Application of the Principles
Three points appear in a survey of the adhesion cases. The first is that
they are mostly insurance cases93 and that, outside California, adhesion
theory is mentioned and applied only in insurance cases. 94 This is
probably no accident. Although Professor Keeton has criticized "the
favorite generalization, . . . the ambivalent, suggestive and wholly
unsatisfactory aphorism: 'it's an insurance case,' "95 the generalization
may nevertheless contain a kernel of truth. Insurance situations present
the context precisely most appealing for the application of adhesion
theory: on the one hand there is the faceless insurance company, awash
in cash; on the other hand there is the hapless individual. There is no
90. Player v. George M. Brewster & Son, 13 Cal. App. 3d 526, 533, 96 Cal. Rptr. 149,
154 (1971); Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 695, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781,784
(1961). See also cases cited note 63 supra. For a view of the courts' treatment of
ambiguity in an insurance context, see Comment, The Adhesion Contract of Insurance, 5
SANTA CLARA LAW. 60 (1964):
The strict view is that where provisions are definite and certain there is no room for
interpretation and the courts will not indulge in a forced construction in order to cast a
liability upon an insurer which is not assumed. . . .The more liberal view appears to
rely on ambiguity to justify sweeping alterations of the contracts.
Id. at 64-65 (footnotes omitted).
91. See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 868-69, 377 P.2d 284, 288,
27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (1962); Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d
988, 995, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 (1974); Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 370, 93
Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (1971). See also cases cited note 63 supra.
92. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963); Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87
(1968). But see cases cited note 65 supra, stating adhesion contracts are effective absent
ambiguity or lack of notice. To bring a case within this third rationale it may be necessary
to find additional factors. See text accompanying notes 103-06 infra.
93. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1962); Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528
(1974); Hays v. Pacific Indem. Group, 8 Cal. App. 3d 158, 86 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1970); Young
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 453, 77 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1969); Schmidt v.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1969); Lagomarsino v.
San Jose Abstract & Title Ins. Co., 178 Cal. App. 2d 455, 3 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1960).
94. See cases cited note 47 supra.
95. Keeton, supra note 59, at 961.
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bargaining and probably little difference between available policies. Not
finding coverage, when the insured has suffered an arguably insured loss,
will result in (1) complete frustration and negation of what the policyhold-
er bought the insurance for in the first place, and (2) an effective
forfeiture, since the company will keep the premiums while paying out
nothing. While adhesion theory in California has not been limited to
insurance cases, their predominance may indicate that application of the
theory is to be confined in practice to the more egregious situation, as
outlined above.
The second point, a related one, is that the majority of cases, insurance
and non-insurance, which use adhesion theory to strike down contract
provisions or interpret language concern contract terms whereby the
stronger party either attempted to excuse its liability for negligence, or to
limit materially what the weaker party would normally expect the stron-
ger party's contractual obligation to be.96 Thus, in Tunk 97 and Henning-
sen,98 both cases grounded substantially in adhesion theory, 99 an excul-
patory provision and a warranty disclaimer, respectively, were denied
effect. In Steven°0 and Logan,' limitations on the obligation to provide
insurance coverage were invalidated.
10 2
The third point is that in some of the more important adhesion cases,
96. See Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 370, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (1971) (between
parties of unequal bargaining strength adhesive exclusionary clauses and provisions
limiting liability ineffective absent "plain and clear notification to the public" and "an
understanding consent"). Accord, Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 32, at 1264 ("The cases
illustrate judicial reluctance to enforce two types of contractual provisions: First, those
relieving the enterprise from liability for negligence in performing obligations based on its
relationship with the other party; and second, those restricting the kind of obligation owed
to the consuming public." (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 1277-78. Justice Tobriner has
written many of the important California adhesion cases.
For cases invalidating exculpatory provisions, see, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60
Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93
Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971); Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1968).
For cases invalidating obligation limitations, see, e.g., cases cited note 93 supra.
97. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963).
98. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
99. See text accompanying notes 49-58 supra.
100. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1962).
101. Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528
(1974).
102. Possibly insurance cases predominate in the adhesion field, see text accompanying
notes 93-94 supra, because they frequently involve these coverage provisions; i.e.,
although adhesion theory was not developed specifically for insurance cases, insurance
cases happen to be especially appropriate for application of the theory.
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those from the California Supreme Court, adhesion theory is presented
with, or buttressed by, other factors. 10 3 Thus, in Steven 104 reference is
made to the air traveller's having to buy the insurance policy before being
able to read it. In Tunkl' 05 the specific holding is grounded in a statute,10 6
and the adhesive nature of the transaction appears in a list of factors.
IV. POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF ADHESION THEORY
There are several possible crticisms of adhesion theory: adhesion
theory may (1) constitute nonmandated judicial regulation of the econo-
my, (2) impair freedom of contract, (3) be inherently unfair and unpre-
dictable because of the subjective nature of "reasonable expectations,"
(4) impose transactional costs, and (5) be unnecessary if other equitable
doctrines are adequate to deal with adhesion contracts.
A. Economic Regulation
Adhesion theory may be susceptible of abuse in that the courts, in
setting contours of the "reasonable expectations" of members of the
public, could substantially regulate any given industry or economic
sector. This danger exists because the concept of "reasonable expecta-
tions" logically goes to the entire substance of a transaction, unlike
unconscionability, which affects only the more extreme substantive as-
pects,10 7 or other doctrines such as mistake, misrepresentation, and
consideration, which speak to the process of contract formation rather
than content.108 Thus, courts could use adhesion theory to interpose
themselves more deeply into economic relationships than they do at
present.
This result might be undesirable for the following reasons: (a) courts
have neither the expertise nor the time for involvement in large-scale
economic regulation; (b) interference in the substance of private
economic relationships, other than in the extreme situation, 1°9 has been
103. Slawson, Lawful Fraud, supra note 6, at 49.
104. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
105. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
106. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1668 (West 1973), which provides: "All contracts which
have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law,
whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law."
107. Courts often discuss unconscionable provisions in contracts as being those so
harsh and oppressive that they "shock the conscience." See Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal.
App. 2d 684, 693, 135 P.2d 179, 183 (1943); State Fin. Co. v. Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688,
691-92, 112 P.2d 901, 903 (1941).
108. See generally 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 103-107, 109-151 (1963 & Supp. 1971); 3
id. § 599 (1960).
109. See note 107 supra.
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reserved in our system of government to the legislative-and through it,
the administrative-branch;" 0 (c) it might result in the imposition of
transactional costs; 1" and (d) it might constitute interference with free
economic forces.
112
There has been no indication that the state judiciary is on the verge of
any such wholesale or extreme use of adhesion theory, or of applying it
to its theoretical limits. But the mere possibility of such application, if
the above concerns are given any weight, might justify limiting the
theory or abolishing it altogether if other approaches served those limited
purposes to which the theory has so far been put.
Of course it may be argued that adhesion theory really addresses
contract procedure and that differences in contract terms will not render a
transaction any more or less adhesive since adhesive character is deter-
mined by the status relationship of the parties.1 3 Such an argument,
however, misses the point: precisely because parties cannot alter the
adhesive nature of their rdlationship, 1 4 to use adhesive nature as justifi-
cation for application of a specialized regulating device, adhesion theory,
necessarily means that the device will be substantively-oriented. In other
words, the courts cannot change the adhesive character of contract
formation in a given relationship any more than the parties can; there-
fore, any regulation must go to substance. An exception to this logic is
recognized when the stronger party does not make sufficiently clear to
the weaker party what it is the latter is adhering to; in this case, the court
can order better notice without addressing substance.
110. The legislature has enacted regulatory measures affecting the making of insurance
contracts, the very area of the economy in which the use of adhesion theory by the
California courts has been most marked. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 12919-12977 (West 1972 &
Supp. 1977) (powers and duties of Insurance Commissioner). Contracts in other "public
service industries," where use of adhesion theory would also be likely, Tobriner &
Grodin, supra note 32, at 1277-78, have also been addressed by the legislature. See, e.g.,
CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 200, 210 (West Supp. 1977) (State Banking Department and Superin-
tendent of Banks).
Note also that the legislature has shown itself willing and able to regulate form contracts
specifically. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text. This is precisely the purpose
for which adhesion theory might be used.
Additionally, it is offensive to the notions of representative government and separation
of powers for the courts to regulate contracts because of any judicial feeling that the
legislature has "failed"-because, for example, the antitrust laws have not equalized
economic strengths.
11l. See notes 128-31 infra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 115-21 infra and accompanying text.
113. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
114. See Slawson, Lawful Fraud, supra note 6, at 47 ("The party to a contract who has
the superior bargaining power cannot help having it.").
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B. Freedom of Contract
At first blush freedom of contract might not seem apropos to any
criticism of adhesion theory. It is, after all, the seeming lack of that
freedom which led to development of the theory.'
15
This view, however, may miss the forest for the trees. Another
possible approach is to note that the freedom to contract is the freedom to
enter into private economic transactions, not necessarily the freedom to
determine how they shall be made. As such, freedom to contract is part
and parcel of our system's general bias in favor of a private ordering of
society; it need not require that the ordering be between parties of equal
strength or that economic relationships be effected through bargaining.
The private nature of the transaction, rather than the mechanism by
which it is consummated, is the value inherent in the freedom.
Inequality of bargaining power to the point of nonexistence is the
natural result of a society with parties of differing wealth and circum-
stances. It is the inevitable concomitant of a free enterprise economy. In
short, our value system suffers or tolerates that persons be unequal in
their actual, if not legal, stations. For courts to hold that parties cannot
exercise the unequal power that comes with those unequal stations would
be to go against the grain of the parent society.
On the other hand, the approach described above, just as Professor
Slawson's view, 16 is in some respects extreme. Notions of freedom and
individualism are rooted in a time before the advent of the corporate
state. Rousseau's social contract is radically different from that made
between General Motors and John Doe. Jefferson's small farmers are not
the Central Valley's agribusinesses.
It is not unreasonable that contract common law take into account real
changes in society. Although our system is hardly statist, it may fairly be
described as increasingly institutional or corporate; government, corpo-
rations, blocs, groups and associations are displacing the individual as
the moving force in our lives. 117 Surely it is not impolitic for the courts to
consider this reality in dispensing justice.
Yet the judicial system is not designed to remake the fabric of society.
It cannot undo the adhesive nature of a contract because it has no power
to equalize bargaining strength to the point of ensuring genuine negotia-
tion. It cannot break General Motors down to the economic level of John
Doe. The only way the same result can be reached is on an ex post
115. See generally Kessler, supra note 5; notes 27-58 supra and accompanying text.
116. See Slawson, Lawful Fraud, supra note 6, at 12-13.
117. See, e.g.; Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 32, at 1247, 1252.
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contractu basis, with the court substantively rewriting the adhesion,
contract to approximate what it might have been had the parties truly
bargained. For all the reasons stated in the previous section, 1 8 that might
be an undesirable process.
The problem with present adhesion theory is that it offers no logical
stopping point. Where the courts are dealing in unconscionability, a
provision must be really extreme,' must "shock the conscience,"
119
before it is excised. Adhesion theory, where the goal is effectuation of
the weaker party's "reasonable expectations," 120 could, as a doctrinal
matter, go to the entire contract. In other words, adhesion theory could
enable a court to rewrite contract terms that, while not descending to the
level of unconscionability, were less than fair. It is a more sweeping
device, in contemplation if not yet in actual practice; as such, it could be
more susceptible of abuse. And, even as to unconscionability, the legis-
lature expressed a general fear of giving the courts overfree rein to
substantively rewrite contracts. 
121
C. "Reasonable Expectations"
Ostensibly, however, the adhesion test is whether a contract term
meets the weaker party's reasonable expectations, not whether it is fair.
In practice this may not be so. In the leading adhesion case of Steven v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. ,122 discussed above, Justice Tobriner wrote for
.the majority that the air traveller, who bought an adhesion insurance
policy from an airport dispenser and who then was killed on an un-
scheduled carrier when all scheduled carriers had been grounded by bad
weather, would have reasonably expected coverage in such a situation. 123
Justice Traynor stated in dissent that a purchaser would not reasonably
believe the coverage went to other than scheduled air carriers. 
124
118. See notes 107-14 supra and accompanying text.
119. Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal. App. 2d 684, 693, 135 P.2d 179, 183 (1943); State Fin. Co.
v. Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 691-92, 112 P.2d 901, 903 (1941).
120. See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Cal. State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, The Uniform
Commercial Code, 37 J. ST. B. CAL. 117 (1962):
The final recommendation of the Advisory Committee [to the California Senate
Judiciary Committee] and the decision to delete this section [U.C.C. § 2-302 on
unconscionability] . . . was based upon the belief that giving courts unqualified
power to strike down terms they might consider "unconscionable" could result in the
renegotiation of contracts in every case of disagreement with the fairness of provi-
sions the parties had accepted.
Id. at 135-36.
122. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962). See notes 76-78 supra and
accompanying text.
123. 58 Cal. 2d at 868, 377 P.2d at 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
124. Id. at 885, 377 P.2d at 298, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
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The majority's conclusion in Steven raises a question. Is it really
reasonable to expect that a standard flight insurance form contract will
provide coverage for an unscheduled carrier when the regular airlines say
it is unsafe to fly? Particularly when a reasonable person who stopped to
think would realize that the vast majority of those buying such policies
would not be taking such a flight? It seems to this writer that Justice
Traynor made a bona fide attempt in Steven to apply the "reasonable
expectations" measure, whereas Justice Tobriner's opinion was more
result-oriented. The holding in Logan125 that the insured would not have
reasonably expected noncoverage in case of death while intoxicated is
open to similar criticism. Moreover, it is fair to say that the ordinary
layperson's reasonable expectations in most situations are at best ill-
defined. The reasonable expectations test, then, while seemingly conson-
ant with the consensual theory of contract 126 (i.e., what did the adherer
reasonably think he or she was agreeing to?), may be only a covert tool to
reach what a court considers a "fair" result. This is ironic, since
adhesion theory has been praised as a franker judicial approach to
contracts than traditional equitable devices. 1
27
D. Transactional Costs
A further possible criticism of adhesion theory is that in practice it
imposes transactional costs in areas of the economy without any popular
or legislative mandate to do so. If a court makes a specific ruling on an
adhesion contract which increases costs for the offering enterprise (as,
for example, where an insurance company is required to extend its
coverage), obviously those increased costs will eventually be passed on
to all the enterprise's customers in the form of higher rates or prices. Yet
the bulk of those customers might prefer lower costs without the judicial-
ly-ordered modification. 128 Moreover, the mere fact that businesses may
have to carry on contractual relationships in an air of uncertainty over
what the courts will do to each term and provision will increase legal and
administrative costs for both the enterprises and their customers. Of
course, this is also true for rulings based on public policy 129 or uncon-
125. 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1971).
126. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550 (West 1954), which provides in relevant part: "It
is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be . . . consent ... 
Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 700.
127. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, at 1090.
128. And note that "[t]he cost of judicial . . . intervention to perfect a market may
exceed the benefits such protection brings." Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard
Form Contracts, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1156 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kornhauser].
129. E.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
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scionability. 130 But since it can be applied more broadly,131 adhesion
theory can cost more.
E. Is Unconscionability Available?
As noted, California rejected U.C.C. section 2-302 on unconscionabil-
ity in contracts for the sale of goods. 132 In letter if not in spirit that
rejection cannot be said to go to other contracts. Further, one of the
reasons given for the rejection was that the concept of unconscionability
was already sufficiently developed in California law. 133 In any event, a
stronger showing will no doubt be required to convince the California
bench that it is without power to act on terms which "shock the con-
science," 134 and properly so. In the case of transactions which reach the
public interest, contract terms may be deleted on grounds of public
policy. It is suggested that all contracts of a "truly adhesive" nature,
i.e., where there is no choice as to the transaction or the terms, 135 qualify
as reaching the public interest, 136 and that public policy 137 be available to
strike down unconscionable terms. If for some reason unconscionability
is not available as a doctrine, then adhesion theory is less defensible
since it may constitute covert unconscionability.138
Rptr. 33 (1963); Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1967).
130. E.g., Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal. App. 2d 684, 135 P.2d 179 (1943); State Fin. Co. v.
Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 112 P.2d 901 (1941).
131. See notes 107-14 supra and accompanying text.
132. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. The use of adhesion theory, definitely
more pronounced in California than elsewhere, see notes 93-94 supra and accompanying
text, might be a judicial reaction to that state's lonely rejection of U.C.C. § 2-302.
133. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
134. See cases cited note 130 supra.
135. Slawson refers to such a situation as "coercion in the 'total' sense." Slawson,
Standard Form Contracts, supra note 1, at 549.
136. See Tunki v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
137. See id.; Akin v. Business Title Corp4 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1968), although note that the holding in the former was based on CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668
(West 1973).
138. There are several indications that adhesion theory may be covert unconscionabili-
ty. Cases in which adhesive factors played a part have been decided on the ground of
"public policy." Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963); Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1968). Similarly, an appellate court of a sister state has held that "[t]he characterization
of a lease as an adhesion contract because exacted by reason of a gross disparity in
bargaining power is to enable the court to protect the injured party from an unconsciona-
ble contract provision." Blakely v. Housing Auth., 8 Wash. App. 204, 212-13, 505 P.2d
151, 156 (1973). Further, Corbin states that "[s]tatidardized contracts such as insurance
policies, drafted by powerful, commercial units and put before individuals on the 'accept
this or get nothing' basis, are carefully scrutinized by the courts for the purpose of
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V. ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED APPROACH
Are "reasonable expectations," or "fair," concepts inherently more
difficult to apply than "shocking to the conscience"? Don't judges
always have to draw lines, even difficult ones, and doesn't the justice
system ultimately have to rely on the reasonableness of the persons who
staff it? And is it not true that in a civilized society, no one can be heard
to complain that he or she is required to meet standards of honesty,
integrity and fair dealing? Is it not true that members of the public should
not be bullied by misuse of economic power?
The answer to all these questions must be yes. So what is wrong with
adhesion theory?
Basically, what is wrong is that, as it has been elucidated, adhesion
theory may afford courts leeway to go further than they should. It offers
the possibility of more substantive rewriting of contracts, heavier imposi-
tion of transactional costs, and extended judicial interference in non-
judicial processes. It is suggested that adhesion theory be redefined as
strictly a notice requirement, without reference to "reasonable expecta-
tions. "
A. The Question of Agreement
Because parties to a contract will usually be of different, if not
markedly different, bargaining strengths, "agreement" on any term will,
for one party, contain elements of "coercion." A lack of bargaining
power, or of bargaining, cannot therefore be said to negate an inference
of agreement, or consent, which is necessary to formation of a
contract.139 What is crucial is that the weaker party assent to the transac-
tion qua transaction, by agreeing it should be entered into. One who does
not have to enter into a given relationship, but who nevertheless does so,
can fairly be said to have agreed to the terms even if he or she has no
option to vary them.
It is where the weaker party has no choice as to terms, and no realistic
choice as to the transaction itself, that he or she can truly be said to be
"coerced." It is in this situation that agreement can in no way be
inferred; it does not exist. The situation is "truly adhesive." Slawson is
correct to this extent when he states that absence of choice rather than
absence of bargaining is the key in analysis of form contracts. t40
avoiding enforcement of 'unconscionable contracts.' "6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1376
(1962); see also C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 168, 180 (Iowa
1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 234, Comment a at 107 and Comment d at
II (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
139. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550 (West 1954).
140. Slawson, Lawful Fraud, supra note 6, at 48.
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B. Substance and Procedure: Notice
When there is no choice, and hence no agreement, courts are properly
concerned to prevent overreaching by the stronger party and to "carve"
the terms of the transaction into some semblance of decency.14 1 It is
suggested, however, that California courts should limit their "carving"
to only the clearly objectionable aspects of a transaction which could be
called unconscionable. 142 Limiting the type of terms subject to deletion
would minimize judicial interference with private transactions: if one
judge thinks a term is unconscionable, the odds are that those judges who
disagree will think it is at least less than fair, whereas disagreement that a
term is unfair or is not reasonably expected probably expresses afeeling
that it is fair or is reasonably expected. In other words, limiting the area
of inquiry to grossly inequitable provisions is more likely to lead to a
consensus that the provision in question is ill-advised and that judicial
action toward it is appropriate. For all the reasons stated above,143
wholesale substantive regulation of mass transactions should be left to
the legislature; if it "fails" to regulate to the satisfaction of the judges, so
be it. 144
Procedural regulation by the courts of no-choice, no-bargaining trans-
actions 14 is theoretically more acceptable because it presumably goes not
to economic power, nor to the use thereof, but to the manner of use. That
is, it is two steps isolated from the full-scale judicial reworking of the
economy that no one has suggested is appropriate. A direct attack on the
existence of economic power, as for example divestiture in an antitrust
suit, has not been suggested in an adhesion context (and, indeed, there
would be no statutory or common law basis for it). The use of economic
power is closer to or in the target area of adhesion theory. If a party has
great superiority of economic strength, and hence, bargaining power, it
may not be permitted to use it and thereby obtain contract terms that fully
reflect the disparity, i.e., those which are shockingly one-sided. This is
substantive use of the theory. Development of a specialized procedure in
adhesion settings, as has been the inclination with respect to notice,
146
says to the stronger party: without referring to the substantive content of
your terms, what terms you do set must be set in certain defined ways.
141. Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 703 n.7.
142. See generally Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal. App. 2d 684, 135 P.2d 179 (1943); State Fin.
Co. v. Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 112 P.2d 901 (1941).
143. See notes 107-14 supra and accompanying text.
144. See note I 10 supra.
145. I.e., the "truly adhesive" transactions referred to earlier. See text accompanying
note 140 supra. Slawson speaks of coercion in the "total" sense. Slawson, Standard
Form Contracts, supra note 1, at 549.
146. See notes 75-88 supra and accompanying text.
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How are the courts to decide which situations are truly adhesive? By
what yardstick are judges to determine if there is really no choice as to
whether to enter into a transaction? For example, we all have to eat, but
does that mean we have no choice but to buy groceries at the largest
supermarket chain? The answer must be no; clearly there are alternative
sources of supply, such as other food markets. The availability of real
alternatives is a factor which may simply deny any "truly adhesive"
character to a transaction.147 Conversely, the absence of such alterna-
tives-as where the stronger party is a monopolist or has monopoly
power in its field-may indicate that a transaction is adhesive.
Thus, monopoly or monopoly power in the stronger party to a contract
claimed to be adhesive may be one signal to the judicial troops to give the
transaction special scrutiny. The same signal might be raised where all
the supposed "alternatives" in a contractual setting feature the same
overreaching terms although the true problem may then be that the
antitrust laws do not satisfactorily address oligopoly.
The other signal to the courts that special scrutiny may be advisable is
a legislative determination of the "public" character of an enterprise.
This signal would be the same one which would satisfy the first require-
ment in Tunkl that a transaction concern "a business of a type generally
thought suitable for public regulation," 148 before it be deemed to reach
the public interest and, therefore, not allowed to contain an exculpatory
provision. Or, more comprehensively, it might be required that a number
of the six Tunkl factors be fulfilled so as to have the transaction in
question reach the "public interest." 14 9 Such a signal could be institution
of permanent administrative regulation of scrutiny of an industry, such as
by the Insurance Commissioner, 150 Banking Department and Superin-
tendent, 5 or Public Utilities Commission. 152
The specialized procedural regulation could be cast entirely in terms of
notice; all material terms must be brought to the attention of the weaker
party by "conspicuous, plain and clear" language. 153 In short, the "truly
147. Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Hurd & Bush, supra note 2, at
68; Kornhauser, supra note 128, at 1163. Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to
include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties . . ").
148. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98, 383 P.2d 441,445, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 37 (1963).
149. Id. at 98 & n.9, 99-101, 383 P.2d at 445 & n.9, 446, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37 & n.9, 38.
150. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 12900-12940 (West 1972).
151. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 200, 210 (West 1968).
152. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 100, 102 (West 1970).
153. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 878, 377 P.2d 284, 294, 27 Cal. Rptr.
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adhesive" nature of a transaction would trigger a Truth-in-Contracting
regime. As to the substantive content of "truly adhesive" terms, only
those the equivalent of unconscionable would be excised once notice was
deemed effective.
C. Proposal
The proposal, then, is to confirm the utility of a specialized approach
to contracts that are truly adhesive-those transactions which the weaker
party realistically must enter and whose terms he must accept-and to
redefine or confirm the nature of that approach, adhesion theory, as
essentially procedural and as one going to notice.
This proposal might be set forth as follows:
1. Standard rules for construction and interpretation of contracts,
including the rule construing ambiguities against the drafter, apply to
truly adhesive contracts exactly as they do to any others.
2. Terms in truly adhesive contracts of a public nature154 that shock
the conscience will be stricken on grounds of public policy applicable to
such contracts particularly, or on grounds of unconscionability applicable
to all contracts. A truly adhesive contract will be deemed to be of a public
nature if it satisfies the first or a number of the Tunkl criteria,155 or has
been assigned that status by non-adhesion theory judicial decision (e.g.,
antitrust determination of monopoly) or by legislative indication.
3. All terms in truly adhesive contracts of a public nature must be
presented to the weaker party in a clear, understandable and noticeable
way, such that a reasonable person would be apprised of them.
4. If there has been no effective notice of a given term, and it is not
reasonable, the adherer will not be bound by it.
D. Possible Criticisms of the Proposal and Rebuttals of the Criticisms
1. It would leave untouched adhesion contracts that are not of a
public character.
First of all, these contracts would be subject to the same standard rules
as any others; the courts have not been noticeably without means to deal
with clearly inequitable aspects of such garden variety transactions. 156
172, 182 (1962); see also Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988,
992-93, 116 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530-31 (1974); Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 Cal.
App. 2d 735, 738, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367, 369 (1969).
154. These contracts will invariably be form contracts offered to the public on a mass
basis.
155. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98-101, 383 P.2d 441, 445-
46, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37-38 (1963).
156. See notes 10-26 supra and accompanying text.
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Second, and more importantly, most adhesion contracts are consumer
form contracts prepared for the public on a mass basis. Further, the mark
of a "truly adhesive" transaction is that the weaker party has no choice
but to enter it, i.e., there is a real need for the goods or services in
question. 157 These factors together make it very likely that an adhesion
contract will be found to be of a public nature, since they indicate that a
given transaction represents a real need for large numbers of the public.
2. "Notice" and "unconscionable" are concepts just as elusive as
"fair" or "reasonable expectations."
This may be so, but it is submitted they are better elusive concepts.
There is more likely to be agreement that an allegedly unconscionable
provision is at least unfair, than that an allegedly unfair provision is in
fact so. That is, since "unconscionable" is a stronger classification than
just plain "unfair," there would be more certainty that a term which is
attacked as unconscionable is ill-advised.
As to "notice," in a sense it is a concept which simply casts "rea-
sonable expectations" into an explicitly procedural mold. If you park
your car in a lot, and receive a stub which says in large red letters, "This
is your contract. Read it!" you should be found to have a reasonable
expectation that it is more than an identifying tag for your car, since you
have been given notice.
Similarly, requiring realistically effective notice in a truly adhesive
contract deprives a weaker party of any claim that he reasonably expected
something other than what he got. The judicial inquiry, "would a
reasonable person have been alerted to and have understood these
terms?" is a more workable concept than "what terms would a person
have reasonably expected" because it focuses on only a single facet of a
contract. Of course, the latter inquiry may also focus on only a single
term, but even then, notice appears a more easily ascertainable fact than
an expectation because its sufficiency can be defined legally without
reference to a party's subjective intentions. The rejoinder is that the same
could be said of a "reasonable" expectation, but before continuing ad
infinitum, let us conclude that at bottom "notice" is better because it
deliberately steps away from substantive review, which has been deemed
inadvisable in prior discussion. 1
58
3. What good is a "notice" requirement in a truly adhesive transac-
tion, since by definition the weaker party has to enter the transaction and
accept the terms anyway?
157. See note 145 supra.
158. See notes 107-14 supra and accompanying text.
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This requirement serves three beneficial purposes: (a) it imposes a
degree of procedural decency on stronger parties, which is an end in
itself; (b) it permits courts to attack unfair terms if that procedural
decency has not been accorded; and (c) it enlightens the adhering weaker
party as to what exactly he is getting into, which should improve his basis
for judgment and planning. Note that unconscionable provisions would
be stricken, even if disclosed at the time the transaction is entered into,
under either the Tunkl-Akin public policy reasoning, 15 9 using present
adhesion theory, or under step (2) of the suggested approach. 6° One
should hardly be able to immunize conduct shockingly objectionable or
offensive to the state simply by informing one's victim in advance that
the scaffold is being readied.
Thus the judicial result in such situations could be the same-and
probably would be-under present adhesion theory or under the suggest-
ed approach. The latter has the advantage, however, of going in
straightforward fashion to the heart of the matter and saying, "This is
wrong." Present adhesion theory can, of course, do the same, but it also
offers the avenue of covert manipulation of a "reasonable expectations"
analysis, which for reasons stated 6' should be avoided.
Taking these proposed rules, this article now seeks to test them
through hypothetical application to an industry as yet largely untouched
by adhesion theory: banking.
VI. TEST APPLICATION TO BANKING
A. Are Bank Contracts Adhesive?
The formalized relationships that banks offer to individual members of
the public appear to have all the characteristics of contracts of adhesion.
Arrangements for checking and savings accounts, loans, credit cards,
check-cashing cards, safety deposit boxes, and other services are all
likely to be embodied in standardized form contracts, whether by refer-
ence, incorporation, or actual primary documents.
For example, when a depositor opens a checking or savings account
with a California bank, he generally signs a signature card, which is a
very short printed form with a space for the depositor's signature beneath
a short statement by the bank. 162 This statement invariably incorporates
159. See notes 23, 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
160. See text accompanying notes 154-55 supra.
161. See notes 107-14 supra and accompanying text.
162. One such signature card reads:
The undersigned enters into this bank-depositor agreement with [the Bank] ... and
agrees that this account shall be carried by said Bank as a [checking or savings]
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by reference the bank's rules and regulations. 163 The depositor also gives
pertinent information (address, birthplace, occupation, and the like) on
the card. In general, the courts accept that the signature card is the
contract between bank and depositor.164
This contract is certainly one of adhesion. It is embodied in a standard
form which is offered to all comers. There is extreme disparity of
bargaining power between the bank and the depositor. The latter is
confronted with a standardized signature card which incorporates stand-
ardized bank rules and is given no opportunity to bargain as to what is
offered him. The transaction is proffered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and
written by a more powerful bargainer for its own needs. 65 Although
California courts have neither ruled nor apparently had the opportunity to
rule that a bank/depositor agreement is a contract of adhesion, the
supreme court has held that ambiguities in a standardized contract drafted
and selected by a bank that occupies the superior bargaining position
between the involved parties will be interpreted against the bank.' 6
Standard bank forms other than deposit agreements would similarly
fall within the adhesion category. Thus, a bank trust deed has been held
to be a contract of adhesion. 67 It is a fairly safe proposition that charge
card agreements would be similarly classified. 168 A bank guarantee form
account and that all funds on deposit in said account shall be governed by said Bank's
bylaws, all future amendments thereof, all regulations passed or hereafter to be
passed by its Board of Directors pursuant to said bylaws, and by all rules and
practices as to interest and service charges of said Bank relating to said account.
Undersigned authorizes said Bank to endorse checks, when presented for deposit to
said account, if presented unendorsed. Undersigned further agrees that this agree-
ment shall be governed by the National Banking laws and the laws of the State of
California.
Another reads: "This account with [the bank] . . . shall be governed by applicable
banking laws, customs and Clearing House regulations and by the rules printed in the bank
book; and shall be subject to the service charge schedule of the Bank."
163. Id.
164. Bennett v. First Nat'l Bank, 443 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1971); Blackmon v. Hale, I Cal.
3d 548, 463 P.2d 418, 83 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1970); Larrus v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Cal. App. 2d
884, 266 P.2d 143 (1954); Smith v. Blubaugh, 199 Kan. 89,427 P.2d 443 (1967); Lerbakken
v. Twin City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 230 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. 1975); Welch v. North Hills
Bank, 442 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Radelman v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 61 Misc. 2d 669, 306 N.Y.S. 638 (App. Term 1969); David v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 59 Misc. 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (App. Term 1969); Koutsis v. Zion's Say.
Bank & Trust Co., 63 Utah 354, 225 P. 339 (1924) (by implication).
165. See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text.
166. Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11,480 P.2d 320, 92 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1971).
The Oregon Supreme Court has been confronted with this exact issue, and has ruled that a
bank/depositor agreement is a contract of adhesion. Greenwood v. Beeson, 253 Or. 318,
321, 454 P.2d 633, 636 (1969).
167. Lomanto v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. App. 3d 663, 99 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1972).
168. The highest court in Massachusetts has so held. Lechmere Tire & Sales Co. v.
Burwick, 360 Mass. 718, 277 N.E.2d 503 (1972).
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has been held not to be a contract of adhesion, partially because the
allegedly weaker party was experienced, but also because the contract of
guarantee in its essential parts created rather than limited a liability on the
part of the bank, and because "anyone reading, with a fair degree of
attention, this agreement . . would be warned [of the liability].
' 169
There have been banking cases in California which may be read as
precursors of adhesion theory. In Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home
Savings Bank,17° a 1919 case, and Frankini v. Bank of America, 71
decided in 1939, under the rubric of "trap for the unwary" or inadequate
disclosure, California courts invalidated bank/depositor passbook terms
that sought to alter the traditional common law rule-which now also
finds expression in the Uniform Commercial Code 72-- that the bank is
liable to the depositor on a forged check drawn on the depositor's
account. 173 Other cases used the same rationale to strike down broadly
drawn bank exculpatory provisions regarding stop-payment orders. 74
These early bank cases are consonant with the notion that the courts
appear to limit their use of adhesion theory to exculpatory provisions and
terms materially limiting the stronger party's reasonably expected
contractual obligation.
175
In addition, Tobriner and Grodin note that the courts have held that
banks, as public service institutions, cannot enforce contractual provi-
sions that would limit liability in a manner not expected by, and not
clearly communicated to, the depositor:1 76 "The depositor expects the
bank to perform its 'usual obligations' and courts will not enforce the
169. Oakland Bank of Commerce v. Washington, 6 Cal. App. 3d 793,799, 86 Cal. Rptr.
276, 280 (1970).
170. 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919).
171. 31 Cal. App. 2d 666, 88 P.2d 790 (1939).
172. CAL. COM. CODE § 3404 (West 1964) (codifying U.C.C. § 3-404 (1962 version)).
173. Union Tool Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 P. 424
(1923); Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919); Frankini
v. Bank of America, 31 Cal. App. 2d 666, 88 P.2d 790 (1939); Sommer v. Bank of Italy,
109 Cal. App. 370,293 P. 98 (1930). See also Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank, 446 F.2d 1046
(5th Cir. 1971); Ellis Weaving Mills v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 91 F. Supp. 943
(W.D.S.C. 1950); United States v. Washington Loan & Trust Co., 47 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C.
1942), aff'd, 134 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d
609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973); Basch v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. 2d 316, 139 P.2d 1 (1943);
Hensley-Johnson v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 122 Cal. App. 2d 22, 264 P.2d 973 (1953);
Wussow v. Badger State Bank, 204 Wis. 467, 234 N.W. 720 (1931).
174. Grisinger v. Golden State Bank, 92 Cal. App. 443, 268 P. 425 (1928); Hiroshima v.
Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926).
175. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 32, at 1264; see also Union Bank v. Ross, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 293, 126 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1976); Oakland Bank of Commerce v. Washington, 6 Cal.
App. 3d 793, 86 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1970) (bank guarantee form held not to be an adhesion
contract partially because it created rather than limited a bank liability).
176. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 32, at 1278.
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bank's attempt to avoid such responsibility." 177 There is thus the empha-
sis on notice which it has been suggested be made explicit in adhesion
theory.
B. Are Bank Contracts "Truly Adhesive"?
Those transactions that must be entered into, and whose terms must be
accepted, are "truly adhesive;" there is no choice. If either of those
characteristics is absent, the "adherer" cannot be said to be without
choice. Of course, this is a test which must be applied realistically; the
opportunity to make or find insubstantial variations in terms, or the
possibility of "choosing" to go without something which is really a
necessity in a modem society, should not preclude a transaction from
being characterized as "truly adhesive."
It must be conceded that banking services are a necessity in our lives.
Vast numbers of people have checking accounts, and cash has ceased to
be a factor in many transactions (as indeed checks may do if and when
electronic transfer comes to pass). Bank services are usually indispens-
able in purchasing a home (mortgages), vacationing (travellers' checks),
making major capital outlays (loans), and in saving money (savings
accounts). A less conservative view might even include credit cards as
increasingly one of the necessities of personal finance. In brief, mattress-
stuffing and payment in specie are ideas whose time has passed.
However, the terms of these various arrangements may not necessarily
be invariable. There are a lot of banks around, not to mention a host of
other financial institutions, such as savings and loan associations, credit
unions, financial companies, and the like. As noted, the availability of
genuine alternatives, of meaningful choice, may negate an inference of
adhesion.7 8 For example, with regard to service charges on checking and
savings accounts, it is fairly well known, as a matter of general observa-
tion, that different institutions offer different service charge schedules.
Throughout California, especially in the large metropolitan areas, small-
er local banks may offer lower service charges or even free accounts to
attract business. If a potential depositor found a particular bank's service
rate schedule oppressive, could he or she not shop around among
competing banks?
The "truly adhesive" test should be applied however, not only realis-
tically but even compassionately. Do we mean to require a consumer to
survey all the parking lots downtown to find the one with the least
onerous bailment terms? Should we require that a depositor ferret out the
177. Id.
178. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
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local bank with the most attractive terms when there are branches of
statewide monoliths in every neighborhood, before we will hold the latter
to consumer-oriented review standards? Perhaps so, and perhaps this is
not a decision for the courts. But in applying a test of true adhesion, it is
submitted that the rule of thumb for determining whether the adherer has
a real choice is whether he has a reasonably convenient and meaningful
opportunity to avail himself of that choice. The answer to this inquiry
may vary with the given banking situation.
C. Is Banking of a "Public" Nature?
In Krueger v. Wells Fargo Bank179 the California Supreme Court held
that banking is affected, or "tinged," with a public interest. 180 Justice
Tobriner, the chief architect of California's adhesion theory, 181 stated for
the court that "[b]anking corporations owe their legal existence to state
law, derive their right to practice banking from government license, are
subject to extensive state and national regulation, fulfull important
economic functions often performed by government agencies, and exert
great influence upon the economic health of the nation."'
182
Certainly banking has met the first of the Tunkl criteria, that a business
be shown to be the type generally thought suitable for public regula-
tion: 183 banking is already extensively supervised by both federal 184 and
state185 instrumentalities. Banking also appears to satisfy a number of the
other Tunkl criteria for public policy review: banks hold themselves out
as willing to perform their services for any member of the public (at least
those meeting impersonal requirements), and the property-money-of
179. I1 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974).
180. Id. at 365-66, 521 P.2d at 448-49, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 456-57.
181. See note 96 supra.
182. 11 Cal. 3d at 364-65, 521 P.2d at 448, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 456. The court held, in
determining that a bank cannot use a set-off against an account composed of unemploy-
ment compensation funds or state disability benefits because to do so would defeat the
state policy of providing daily living expenses to the recipient, that the bank is not a state
instrument and that its action is not state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment
of the Federal Constitution. However, the tone of Justice Tobriner's opinion did not
indicate that he would be unhappy the day when, if ever, banks and other "public service
enterprises" were subjected to the requirements of constitutional due process. Id. at 365-
67, 521 P.2d at 448-50, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 456-58.
183. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98, 383 P.2d 441, 445, 32
Cal. Rptr. 33, 37 (1963).
184. See generally, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (Bureau of the Comptroller of the
Currency); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.2 (1977) (regulations of Comptroller of Currency).
185. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 200, 210 (West 1968) (State Banking Department;
Superintendent of Banks).
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the member of the public is under the control of the bank; the bank also
performs a service of great importance to the public and usually pos-
sesses a decisive advantage in bargaining strength.
18 6
D. Test Application to Specific Examples
Assuming, then, for example's sake only, that bank form contracts
merit "full" application of the suggested approach to adhesion
contracts-i.e., they are "truly adhesive," and banking is of a suffi-
ciently "public" nature, let us select three banking situations for a test
application: service charges, stop-payments on guaranteed checks, and
changes in existing contracts such as credit cards.
1. Service Charges
Service charges generally are imposed pursuant to agreement in the
signature card, 8 7 which, without specifying the exact service charge
schedule, grants the bank power to apply whatever the service charge
may be. 8' In addition, the writer's personal experience and observation
are that when a depositor opens a checking or savings account, the
relevant service charges for each available account plan are for the most
part spelled out in detail; the depositor then elects one.
Now suppose a depositor sues the bank, claiming that a given service
charge pattern is oppressively costly and therefore, not within his rea-
sonable expectations. Could a court use adhesion theory to rewrite the
bank's charges, deleting old ones and inserting new ones?
The proposition is dubious on its face; the relatively petty dollar
amount involved, as well as the degree of judicial rewriting of the service
charge schedule which would be necessary, highlights the fact that this is
not the sort of exculpatory provision or material limitation on perform-
ance with which California courts have been primarily concerned. 89
Moreover, given the agreement in the signature card and the procedure at
the opening of the account,190 it seems unlikely that a service charge that
186. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 98-101,383 P.2d 441,445-
46, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37-38 (1963).
187. See examples note 162 supra.
188. Id.
189. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 32, at 1277; notes 93-106 supra and accom-
panying text.
190. See notes 162-64 supra and accompanying text. Note also, first, that one who
signs a contract without reading it is normally bound, Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92,
272 P.2d 26 (1954); Heidlebaugh v. Miller, 126 Cal. App. 2d 35, 271 P.2d 557 (1954); Larrus
v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Cal. App. 2d 884,266 P.2d 143 (1954); 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts §
43 (1974), and second, that the signature card text is brief and simple. Note further that
one California court has held that the allegedly weaker party could not claim that bank
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was short of being really outrageous could be termed not within the
depositor's reasonable expectations. Similarly, under the suggested ap-
proach in this article, the service charges would stand because (1) they
were not unconscionable (i.e. "really outrageous") or against public
policy, and (2) they were effectively disclosed to the depositor.
2. Stop-Payments on Guaranteed Checks 91
Certain banks offer depositors a checking plan that includes a check
guarantee card, by which the bank guarantees the depositor's check to a
merchant in return for the merchant's acceptance of payment by check.
Since the bank guarantees the check at issuance, it naturally wishes and
expects to have the depositor waive his normal stop-payment preroga-
tives, 192 and accordingly includes such a waiver in the deposit agree-
ment. 193
Consider that a depositor, having opened a checking account and
signed the deposit agreement, then makes a purchase by check and
casually shows his guarantee card to the merchant. The depositor is
unaware of the card's legal effect and believes it to be a mere identifica-
tion card, not having paid a great amount of attention to the details of his
bank agreement. Suppose that the depositor subsequently requests that
the bank stop payment on that check, and the bank honors the request
without yet knowing the check is guaranteed since it has not yet been
received. When the check does come in, the bank sees that it is guaran-
teed and pays. May the bank now charge the depositor's account?
There is nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code itself that prohibits
such a contractual variance of the stop-payment right; indeed, section 1-
102 (3) states that "[t]he effect of provisions of this code may be varied
by agreement . . . . " Accordingly, a court could hold that the de-
positor's waiver in the case above was valid, and that the bank could
charge the depositor's account. On the other hand, the court could hold
guarantees on a promissory note were contracts of adhesion because (I) he did not read
the contract, and (2) he did not attempt to renegotiate the term claimed to be adhesive,
i.e., the bank's right to waive the creditor's obligation to sell collateral sufficient to retire
the debt upon the debtor's demand. Union Bank v. Ross, 54 Cal. App. 3d 290, 296, 126
Cal. Rptr. 646, 649-50 (1976). Query, however, if this approach is applicable or realistic
with respect to more usual banking contracts.
191. I am indebted to Assistant Professor Hal S. Scott of Harvard Law School for
suggesting this example.
192. CAL. COM. CODE §§ 4303, 4403 (West 1964).
193. One bank's Check Guarantee Card Agreement reads in part: "Bank is irrevocably
authorized to pay and charge to Holder's checking account all checks guaranteed by
means of the card and Holder waives the right to stop payment on any and all such
checks." The Guarantee Card itself states in part: "Upon compliance with the conditions
of its check guarantee card plan, . . . Bank will guarantee payment. .. ."
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the waiver invalid, using the present adhesion theory to conclude that the
waiver was not within the depositor's reasonable expectations.
"Reasonable expectations," however, is just another way of saying
"notice;" one must reasonably expect that of which he has been effec-
tively notified. "Reasonable expectations," moreover, is a phrase that
ostensibly deals with substantive terms of a contract, while the real
concern on this set of facts is procedural: whether the bank should have
issued the check guarantee card in the first place without bringing home
to the customer its full legal impact and significance or, in other words,
whether the bank had a responsibility effectively to disclose this special
feature. In a "truly adhesive" situation, the answer to this question is
yes,194 and if in fact a person cannot cash a check without a guarantee
card, then the contract is of such a nature.
Otherwise, the guarantee card may not be truly adhesive, and the
customer would be bound to what he signed. On the other hand, under
current adhesion theory, a court can perhaps attack the guarantee agree-
ment as an *adhesion contract even if the transaction need not have been
entered into. 195 The suggested approach, then, shows itself not only to be
cleaner theoretically, but it also draws a tighter rein on the courts in
choosing those contract terms which may be substantively deleted or
rewritten.
Under either current adhesion theory or the suggested approach, the
bank has an absolute defense if it has given effective notice to the
customer of the terms of the guarantee card agreement. This defense is
available because the contract term waiving stop-payment rights cannot
fairly be said to be unconscionable or against public policy.'9 6 Such a
194. See text accompanying notes 155-56 supra.
195. A court will have to judge for itself how understanding it should be in determining
this question. The objective theory of contracts, i.e., that contracts will be judged by
reasonable interpretations of a party's outward manifestations of intent, would seem to
require that little weight be given to whether the individual adherer subjectively felt that he
or she had to enter the transaction. The crucial inquiry would be whether the "reasonable
person" would subjectively feel that way, or, to be even less kind to the adherer, whether
the "reasonable person" objectively did have to make the contract. For example, in
Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962), can it
truthfully be said, without using hindsight, Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal.
App. 3d 315, 325, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816, 822 (1975) (whether contract is one of adhesion must
be determined as of time it was made), that the air traveller realistically had to buy flight
insurance? Most air travellers do not, as a matter of common observation, whereas most
people do mortgage their homes, enter a hospital when ill, maintain a checking account,
and so forth. To ask the stronger party in an allegedly adhesive situation to be on guard for
the individual traits of each customer, e.g., the nervous air passenger who feels he or she
must have insurance, is to require that the stronger party possess a considerable, perhaps
unwarranted, degree of prescience.
196. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
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term cannot be said to shock the conscience or offend the state; the bank
through the guarantee card enlarges its own liability in order to aid the
depositor in his or her merchant-consumer relations and in check-cash-
ing. Although the bank immediately passes on a corresponding liability
to the depositor, the latter is rendered a service at no spectacular profit to
the bank.
3. Changes in Existing Contracts Such as Credit Cards
This example concerns subsequent changes made in existing bank
contracts. Deposit agreements, for instance, generally incorporate by
reference the bank rules and regulations. 197 What are the consequences of
a subsequent change in rules, regulations or terms? An examination of
this question will set the background for consideration of other types of
bank transactions.
Even without a written contract, it has been held in State v. San
Francisco Savings & Loan Society 98 that a depositor, "by dealing with
the bank . . . adopts its regulations which are in existence at the time
... .,,199 In the usual case, the signature card serves as the written
contract 2°° and incorporates by reference the bank's rules and regula-
tions. It is standard contract law in California and elsewhere that matters
may be incorporated into a contract by reference, even though the
accepting party does not know the precise terms of incorporation. 201 An
offeree, without knowing all the contract's terms, may accept whatever
terms it contains.
202
However, a problem is presented should the bank's rules be changed
so as to alter materially the bank/depositor relationship after the account
has been opened. While a depositor without a signature card or other
written contract is governed by the by-laws existing at the time the
account was opened, he must be notified of a change in the by-laws that
materially alters the contract if he is to be bound by the change. 20 3 A by-
197. See Larrus v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Cal. App. 2d 884, 888-90, 266 P.2d 143, 147-48
(1954); note 162 supra.
198. 66 Cal. App. 53, 225 P. 309 (1924).
199. Id. at 61, 225 P. at 312.
200. See note 162 supra.
201. 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 88 (8th ed. 1973 & Supp.
1976). This has been specifically held with respect to a bank signature card incorporating
the bank rules. Larrus v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Cal. App. 2d 884, 889, 266 P.2d 143, 147
(1954).
202. 1 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 88 (8th ed. 1973 & Supp.
1976). Cf., e.g., Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711,725, 197 P.2d 807, 815 (contract
for payment of pension benefits not unenforceable for uncertainty because employee did
not know its exact terms).
203. State v. San Francisco Say. & Loan Soc'y, 66 Cal. App. 53, 61, 225 P. 309, 312
(1924).
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law provision authorizing an amendment of the by-laws cannot give the
bank the power to amend them so as to change the deposit contract
materially without the depositor's knowledge. 204 This would constitute a
"trap for the unwary. "205 It is reasonable that such analysis would also
be used where there is a written deposit contract.
In our example, the contract in question is a credit card agreement
between bank and customer whereby the customer enjoys a thirty-day
period free of interest following a given credit purchase. Suppose that the
bank decides to change that practice and start charging interest im-
mediately on any charge; it mails the customer a new charge card with
the revised rules. The customer pockets the card, disposes of the accom-
panying written material without reading it, and continues nonchalantly
on his illiquid way.
Conceivably this situation could be resolved by a court without resort
to adhesion theory at all. It could instead extend the San Francisco
Savings rationale to other than deposit contracts, and hold that the
withdrawal of the interest-free period worked a material change in the
credit card agreement. In that case, the relevant inquiry under San
Francisco Savings would be notice of the change. As a question of fact,
was the change adequately disclosed to the customer through the infor-
mation supplied with the new card? Would a reasonable customer have
been alerted to the change? If so, the change is effective. If not, the
change is not effective. The court might, in light of ordinary consumer
behavior, expand upon what constitutes adequate disclosure.
Under present adhesion theory, assuming the credit card agreement
were found to be adhesive, the inquiry would be whether the change was
within the credit card holder's reasonable expectations. Presumably this
would require determining if (1) the holder had originally agreed to let
the bank make subsequent changes, and (2) the notice of the change was
sufficient ("conspicuous, plain, and clear").2" In other words, the
approach would be very similar to the one described in San Francisco
Savings, which strengthens the earlier suggestion that the old bank cases
are precursors of adhesion theory.
2°7
204. Id.; see also Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, 47 Cal. 2d 540,552, 305 P.2d 20, 28 (1956);
Spencer v. Hibernia Bank, 186 Cal. App. 2d 702, 737, 9 Cal. Rptr. 867, 889-90 (1960);
Soci6t6 de Bienfaisance St. Jean Baptiste de Millbury v. Peoples Say. Bank, 117 N.E.2d
921, 922-23 (Mass. 1917).
205. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 613, 182 P. 293,298 (1919);
Frankini v. Bank of America, 31 Cal. App. 2d 666, 675, 88 P.2d 790, 795 (1939).
206. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 878,377 P.2d 284, 294, 27 Cal. Rptr.
172, 182 (1962). Cf. Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 994,
116 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 (1974) ("clear and plain").
207. See notes 170-71 supra and accompanying text.
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The problem with present adhesion theory in this example, however, is
that its "reasonable expectations" test offers the possible invitation to a
court so inclined to declare, as a substantive matter, that the elimination
of the interest-free period was unfair and impermissible, and therefore
not within the credit card holder's reasonable expectations.
Very possibly such use is unlikely. But its mere possibility argues for a
redefinition of adhesion theory so as to bar that approach. Under the
suggested approach, 0 8 it would first be asked if the credit card agreement
were "truly adhesive." This need not be a harsh test; the inquiry could
be whether the average consumer found a credit card to be reasonably
necessary to daily life. If the agreement were not truly adhesive, then it
would be analyzed as any other contract, and so a court would fall back
upon the general contract law found in San Francisco Savings and
discussed above. If the agreement were truly adhesive, the suggested
approach analysis would still be the same, focusing on effective notice,
but without the theoretical potential for covert manipulation latent in
current adhesion theory. On the example's set of facts, there would be no
grounds for substantive setting-aside of the change; it simply is nowhere
near unconscionable or contrary to public policy for a bank to charge its
customer for the full period of a credit loan, nor does it even seem unfair.
VII. CONCLUSION
"Contracts of adhesion" are those which are offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, with no bargaining and no choice. They are usually
standard form consumer contracts which have come to play a dominant
and useful role in our modern economy. Beyond the traditional equitable
doctrines available in contract law, California courts have developed a
specialized "adhesion theory" that may invalidate any term in an adhe-
sion contract not within the weaker party's "reasonable expectations."
To date, its use has been largely confined to invalidating exculpatory
provisions and terms materially limiting the stronger party's expected
performance, primarily in insurance cases.
Because of the potential for abuse of the "reasonable expectations"
test to extend judicial rewriting of substantive terms, adhesion theory
might be redefined to cast it as primarily a specialized notice device
requiring effective disclosure of terms in those contracts that are "truly"
adhesive-where the weaker party must enter the transaction and must
accept its terms, and limiting substantive review to terms that are uncon-
scionable or against public policy.
208. See text accompanying notes 154-55 supra.
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